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The Stock Market’s Pricing of Customer Satisfaction 
 
Abstract 
 
 
A number of recent marketing studies examine the stock market’s response to the release of 
American Customer Satisfaction Index (ACSI) scores.  The broad purpose of these studies is to 
investigate the stock market’s valuation of customer satisfaction. However, a key focus is on 
whether customer satisfaction information predicts long-run returns.  We provide evidence on 
the market’s pricing of ACSI information using a more comprehensive set of well-established 
tests from the accounting and finance literatures.  We find that ACSI scores provide some 
incremental information on future operating income and that the market quickly responds to the 
release of information on large increases in satisfaction.  However, we find no evidence that 
ACSI predicts long-run returns.  These results suggest that customer satisfaction information is 
value-relevant, but are also consistent with Jacobson and Mizik’s (2009) conclusion that 
mispricing of ACSI information, if present at all, is limited. 
 
 
1 
The Stock Market’s Pricing of Customer Satisfaction 
 
1.  Introduction 
Recent marketing research has emphasized the stock market’s valuation of customer 
satisfaction.  This emphasis is not surprising given the potential economic benefits from higher 
satisfaction (such as customer retention and loyalty, price tolerance, word of mouth 
recommendations, etc.) and claims that stock market participants do not accurately impound 
customer satisfaction and other marketing information in share prices.  Researchers’ ability to 
study the market’s pricing of customer satisfaction has been greatly aided by the development of 
the American Customer Satisfaction Index (ACSI), which provides a novel dataset that uses a 
common methodology to collect customer satisfaction data for a broad cross-section of major 
U.S. companies.  These data give researchers the unique ability to link the release of a standard 
set of non-mandated, firm-level marketing information to publicly-available operating and stock 
market performance measures. 
Studies examining this link have largely concentrated on the stock market’s short-term 
response to the release of new ACSI scores and/or investors’ ability to use the ACSI to earn 
abnormal long-run stock returns.  Fornell et al. (2006), for example, conclude that the market 
does not respond to ACSI scores at their release, but that a trading rule based on the ACSI data 
can produce substantial long-run returns.  Aksoy et al. (2008) examine whether the “mispricing” 
of ACSI information identified by Fornell et al. (2009) is an artifact of risk differences, and again 
conclude that the ACSI can be used to earn substantial abnormal long-run stock returns, a result 
consistent with market mispricing.  In contrast, the current study by Jacobson and Mizik (2009) 
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finds relatively little ability of the ASCI to predict long-run abnormal stock returns (with the 
potential exception of a small set of internet firms).   
Given the mixed results in these studies and their differences in research methodologies 
and choices (some of which are unusual), we provide another examination of the stock market’s 
pricing of ACSI information using well-established econometric methods from the accounting 
and finance literatures.  In contrast to the piecemeal approaches used in prior studies, we take a 
more comprehensive look at the valuation of ACSI scores.  We begin by examining whether the 
ACSI is associated with future firm operating performance (revenues, profit margins, and 
operating income).  If ACSI predicts future operating performance, then in an efficient market 
we expect stock prices to react to unexpected component of ACSI.  We then re-examine the 
market’s short-term response to the release of ACSI information.  If the market prices ACSI in 
an efficient manner, then we expect a quick adjustment to the new information, in which case 
ACSI will predicts short-run returns.  Finally, we use more typical investor expectation models 
and portfolio formation rules from the accounting and finance literatures to investigate the ability 
to use ACSI information to earn abnormal long-run stock returns.    If the market misprices 
ACSI, then we expect a delayed adjustment to new information, in which case ACSI will predict 
long-run returns. 
Analyses using this broader set of tests suggest that the ACSI has incremental ability to 
predict future operating performance (which should be the key input into market valuation) and 
that large, unexpected ACSI improvements are associated with substantial short-term 
announcement period abnormal returns.  However, we find that ACSI appears to be quickly 
impounded into stock prices by the market and does not predict long-term abnormal returns.  
Consistent with the studies by Fornell et al. (2006) and Aksoy et al. (2008), these results suggest 
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that the market does value ACSI information, but the significant announcment period response to 
the release of new ACSI scores, together with the lack of significant long-run abnormal returns, 
are more consistent with Jacobson and Mizik’s (2009) conclusion that the mispricing of ACSI 
information is limited.   
 
2.  Background 
 Concluding that the market has mispriced new, value-relevant information requires three 
conditions to hold.  First, the information being released must provide an unexpected, 
incremental signal about future operating performance (or discount rates) that is not available 
from existing information.1  Even if improvements in certain customer satisfaction attributes lead 
to higher future operating performance in individual firms (as many studies have found), a 
common measure such as the ACSI may not be a valid indicator of customer satisfaction across a 
broad sample of firms. Unless the ACSI is incrementally predictive of subsequent operating 
performance (above current operating performance) in the sample used in the study, any finding 
of an association between the release of ACSI scores and stock market returns is questionable. 
  Second, even if the ACSI provides incremental information on future operating 
performance, these benefits must not be (fully) anticipated by the market.2  In this regard it is the 
unexpected component of ACSI that will be priced by the market. As Jacobson and Mizik (2009) 
                                                            
1 In a frictionless market, stock price is equal to the present value of future cash flows. 
2 For example, ACSI levels are highly autocorrelated and the new scores may already be anticipated by the market. 
Tuli and Bharadwaj (forthcoming) report that ACSI scores from 1994 to 2006 have a time series correlation of 0.91 
(p < 0.001) from one year to the next.  Given this significant autocorrelation, existing satisfaction levels may already 
allow the market to anticipate any future operating performance implications and accurately impound expectations 
about these benefits in current stock prices.  Consequently, the new scores may be expected and their release may 
not provide incremental information or affect stock returns, even though higher customer satisfaction scores provide 
economic benefits.  
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note, the efficient markets hypothesis argues that stock market participants quickly and 
efficiently impound all available information into their expectations of future cash flows, and 
therefore into stock prices. According to this perspective, the release of new information such as 
ACSI updates may be value-relevant and move the market in the short-term, but investors should 
not be able to use this information to achieve long-term abnormal returns. Thus, mispricing 
implies that the new information is not fully impounded into stock price at its release.  
 Third, if significant mispricing has occurred, the accounting and finance literatures argue 
that trading rules based on new, unexpected information should allow informed traders to earn 
positive longer-term risk-adjusted returns based upon their superior knowledge of the 
information’s ultimate value implications. Such “market anomalies” occur when market 
participants do not accurately assess the future financial implications of the new information and 
informed traders lack sufficient capital to arbitrage away the mispricing.   
Absent all three of these conditions, empirical studies may find significant associations 
between marketing measures such as the ACSI and operating or stock market performance, but 
their piecemeal results make it difficult to conclude that the information is or is not mispriced by 
the market.  Jacobson and Mizik (2009), as well as the study by Aksoy et al. (2008), focus on the 
third condition without examining whether the ACSI measures in their sample actually provide 
incremental information on future operating performance or whether the market responds to 
unexpected innovations in ACSI measures when they initially are released.3  Fornell et al. (2006) 
examine the market’s short-term response to the release of ACSI information, finding no 
evidence that the market responds to the release of new ACSI measures, but provide some 
                                                            
3 Aksoy et al. (2008) report similar accounting returns (return on assets and return on equity)  in (1) firms with 
above average ACSI levels and increasing ACSI scores, and (2) firms with above average ACSI levels but declining 
scores.  However, they do not examine whether ACSI measures are leading indicators of these financial measures, 
and focus their long-run valuation tests on the first set of firms.  
5 
evidence that the market responds to the ACSI in the long term. Aksoy et al. (2008) rely on 
Fornell et al.’s (2006) insignificant, short-term event study evidence in their justification for 
focusing on long-term mispricing of ACSI information, assuming that (in the short-term) the 
market does not accurately or efficiently react to the release of new information.   They do not 
examine the short-term market response to the release of new ACSI information in their sample.  
None of the preceding studies examines the association between current ACSI and future 
operating performance, or whether all three conditions hold in a single sample. These limitations 
raise questions about the extent to which the market (accurately) responds to the release of 
marketing information such as the ACSI. 
 
3. Sample 
We provide examination of the stock market’s response to ACSI information by 
examining the three conditions discussed above in a single sample using standard econometric 
techniques from the accounting and finance literatures.  We examine the valuation of ACSI 
information released from the first quarter of 1995 to the fourth quarter of 2006, inclusive.  An 
important (and nontrivial) issue when dealing with ACSI data is how to handle scores for firms 
with both the parent and lower-level units or brands in the index, with the parent not represented 
but multiple divisions or brands appearing in the index, or with firms that merge (with or without 
the merged units that previously appeared in the ACSI continuing in the index).  Few studies 
using ACSI data report how they deal with these circumstances, which can have significant 
implications for their results.  We explicate our choices in the Appendix. Although all such 
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choices are somewhat arbitrary, we attempt to minimize problems that can arise when studies 
simplistically link ACSI scores to company identifiers in common financial databases.4  
The process reported in the Appendix yields 243 firms on COMPUSTAT, for a total of 
1,795 firm-years with non-missing ACSI data.  We use the ACSI’s release date conventions to 
assign announcement dates to each firm-year. After requiring a lagged ACSI value (to compute 
changes in the scores), an ACSI announcement date prior to 2007, and market values on the 
CRSP daily file in the five days prior to the ACSI announcement, our final sample consists of 
1,450 firm-year observations (substantially larger than the samples in related studies).  
 
4. ACSI Scores and Future Operating Performance          
 Table 1 provides evidence on the first condition by examining the association between 
current ACSI scores and operating performance in the subsequent year.  We examine three 
performance measures that the marketing literature suggests are related to customer satisfaction: 
revenues, profit margins, and return on assets (ROA).  Prior research has shown that operating 
performance is very persistent (e.g., Penman, 1992; Fama and French, 2000).  We therefore 
include the respective operating performance measures in the prior year as control variables.  
Similar to prior studies, we also include firm size (measured using the log of the firm’s market 
capitalization), the firm’s book-to-market ratio (an inverse proxy for the firm’s growth 
opportunities), and indicators for the firm’s industry membership as additional controls. Standard 
                                                            
4 For example, early in the sample period ACSI reports scores for both Philip Morris and its subsidiary Kraft Foods.  
Naively matching both companies to financial databases would result in researchers double counting the parent’s 
operating and stock performance.  That is, on a given date there would be two identical operating performance and 
returns observations for Philip Morris, each linked to a different ACSI score. A similar problems arises when 
companies merge but ACSI continues to report scores for the individual entities (e.g., Compaq and Hewlett-
Packard) 
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errors are clustered by firm and by year to correct for both serial and cross-sectional dependence 
(see Gow et al., 2009). 
 With one exception, all three operating performance measures have significant, positive 
associations (p < 0.10, two-tailed) with ACSI scores across the various models, even after 
controlling for past operating performance and the other control variables.  The incremental R2 
from the addition of the ACSI score (above the explanatory power of the control variables 
included in the models) ranges from 0.02% to 3.95%.  Although the incremental explanatory 
power is relatively small, the coefficients are economically significant for some of the tests.  For 
example, the full ROA model indicates that a 10 point higher ACSI score is associated with a 
1.3% higher return on assets in the next year.  These results suggest that the ACSI measure is a 
significant, incremental indicator of future operational performance, and should therefore be 
priced by the market. 
 
5. Short-Term Stock Price Response to ACSI Changes 
 We next examine the market’s short-term response to the release of new ACSI scores.  
Even though ACSI levels appear to be predictive of future financial performance, the market 
may already impound this information in share prices, particularly given the strong 
autocorrelation in ACSI scores.  As a result, the release of new ACSI scores may have little 
effect on share prices, even though customer satisfaction is value-relevant.   
Fornell et al. (2006), for example, report no significant market reaction to the release of 
ACSI scores between the second quarter of 1999 and the third quarter of 2002 over short event 
windows (one to ten days after announcement).  Surprisingly, Fornell et al.’s (2006) tests only 
examine the reaction to dichotomous positive or negative changes in ACSI, and do not examine 
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the magnitude of the changes as is typical in accounting and finance event studies.  In doing so, 
they treat very small positive (negative) changes the same as very large positive (negative) 
changes. 
Since the conclusion that the market misprices customer satisfaction information rests on 
investors not quickly incorporating this information into share prices when initially released, we 
re-examine the short-term market reaction to new ACSI information.  In contrast to Fornell et al. 
(2006), we follow the more typical accounting and finance practice of measuring the amount of 
new (or unexpected) information provided to the market using percentage changes in ACSI 
scores since the last release.5    
Table 2 provides basic event study results for our sample.  We form five portfolios based 
on the magnitude of percentage changes in ACSI scores.6 The median (mean) percentage ACSI 
change for the entire sample is 0% (-0.26%), reflecting the fact that the ACSI is not updated for 
every industry each quarter and the strong autocorrelation in ACSI scores.  However, median 
percentage changes across the five portfolios range from -4.71% to 4.11%, suggesting that a 
simple split into positive and negative changes disguises significant variations in the new 
information being conveyed.  
Panel A reports both average raw and market-adjusted buy-and-hold returns for the five 
trading days prior to the ACSI release.  The market-adjusted returns control for changes in stock 
prices that are due to general market movements rather than to the release of ACSI information.  
                                                            
5 The choice of a market “expectation model” is extremely important when investigating the market’s valuation of 
information.  As Sullivan et al. (1999) note, it is always possible to find excess returns if enough specifications are 
examined (i.e., aggressively using “data mining”).  We use ACSI changes in all our valuation tests not only because 
this is the typical computation for the “unexpected” portion of a variable in accounting and finance, but also because 
it is less susceptible to the “data mining” critique.   By using a percentage change measures, we are implicitly 
assuming decreasing returns to scale (i.e. a 5 unit increase in ACSI for a company with an ACSI score of 10 is more 
meaningful that a 5 unit increase in ACSI for a company with an ACSI score of 90). 
6 Using percentage changes as our measure of unexpected performance may tend to place firms with lower ASCI 
satisfaction levels in Quintile 5 (the quintile with the largest increases in satisfaction scores) because it is easier to 
achieve a larger percentage change when the denominator is smaller.   
9 
If the release of ACSI information provides new information that is not anticipated by the market 
prior to the event date used in our analyses, we should see no significant association between 
changes in ACSI and returns during this pre-event period. Test statistics are clustered by event 
date to correct for cross-sectional dependence.  The only portfolio that exhibits significant 
returns (p < 0.10, two-tailed) is Quintile 5 (largest increases in ACSI) using raw returns, but none 
of the portfolio returns is significant using market-adjusted returns.  The insignificant returns 
indicate that changes in ACSI do not predict returns in the days prior to the scores’ release, 
consistent with these changes not being anticipated by the market over this period.   
 Panel B of Table 2 examines returns from the ACSI release date (day 0) to the fifth 
trading day after release.  Raw returns are positive and significant in the three quintiles with the 
largest percentage increases in ACSI, with the returns becoming larger as the portfolios’ ACSI 
changes increased.  However, only the returns in Quintile 5 (those firms with the largest ACSI 
changes) are significant when market-adjusted returns are examined.  The mean (median) 
percentage change in ACSI for firms in this quintile is 4.84% (4.11%). For these firms, the 
release of ACSI information is associated with a market-adjusted announcement period return of 
1.3%.   
The results in Table 2 do not control for differences in risk that may account for the 
observed differences in returns.  The omission of risk factors potentially leads to erroneous 
interpretations regarding the relation between ACSI measures and stock returns (e.g., Aksoy et 
al., 2008).  We therefore conduct a more advanced event study using the Fama-French (1996) 
three-factor model commonly employed in accounting and finance research.  This model 
estimates the excess return on a security (i.e. return in excess of the risk-free rate) over a given 
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period as a function of risk factors associated with size (SMB), value (HML), and covariance risk 
with the market risk premium (MKTRF)7  
We estimate the three-factor model for each of the ACSI percentage change quintiles 
over the 121-trading day period (approximately six months) centered on the scores’ 
announcement.  We include an indicator variable (denoted ANNC) that equals one on the 
announcement date and the following five-trading days (Panel A), 20-trading days (Panel B), 40-
trading days (Panel C), or 60-trading days (Panel D) to assess the market’s reaction to the new 
ACSI information.  Tuli and Bharadwaj (forthcoming) find that ACSI changes are associated 
with changes in firm risk.  Consequently, we also include interactions between ANNC and each 
of the included risk-factors to examine whether the announcement influences the market’s 
assessment of firm risk over the event periods. 
The more advanced event study results are reported in Table 3.  Consistent with the 
results in Table 2, the only portfolio exhibiting a significant association between stock returns 
and the announcement of ACSI changes is Quintile 5 (the largest ACSI changes).  The 
coefficient on ANNC (α1) is 0.15 over the 5-day event window and 0.10 over the 20-day 
window.  In addition, for firms in Quintile 5 the interaction between ANNC and MKTRF (β1) is 
negative and significant in the five-day window. This suggests that that a large increase in ACSI 
scores (temporarily) lowers the market’s risk assessment for these firms.  However, as the event 
windows become longer, neither the announcement indicators nor the interaction terms are 
                                                            
7 Fornell et al.’s (2006) event study uses abnormal returns from a market model that captures the MKTRF risk 
factor, but not the SMB or HML factors.  All of our results are similar when we use the Carhart (1997) four-factor 
model that also includes a factor for stock return momentum. 
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significant (p < 0.10, two-tailed), suggesting that ACSI changes are quickly incorporated into 
share prices.8 
In sum, the event study results indicate that the market does respond to the release of new 
ACSI information, but only when improvements are relatively large.  Moreover, the market 
appears to quickly impound this information into share price, a result inconsistent with 
mispricing. This evidence differs from Fornell et al.’s (2006) conclusion (based on a shorter time 
period and different methodology) that ACSI information is not valued by the market at its 
release.9  
 
6. Long-Run Pricing of ACSI Information 
Finally, similar to Jacobson and Mizik (2009) and the earlier ACSI valuation studies, we 
conduct portfolio tests of the long-run valuation of ACSI information.  An important issue in 
these tests is the expectations model used to assess the “new” information provided by the 
release of ACSI scores.  Efficient markets theory argues that the market should only react to the 
unanticipated component of the information since the anticipated component should already be 
impounded in share price.  The typical method used in accounting and finance research is 
examining the market’s response to changes in a measure, particularly when the measure is 
highly autocorrelated like the ACSI.  Examining ACSI changes rather than levels not only is 
                                                            
8 One problem with our event study is that important information, other than the ACSI, is generally released during 
the same time period where the excess returns are computed.   These information events have the potential to 
confound the results in Table 3.  In an attempt to identify problematic observations, firms with excess returns 
outside the 1st and 99th percentiles or outside the 5th and 95th percentile were dropped from the analysis.   The 
inferences are not changed after eliminating the impact of potentially problematic firms.   
9 We also follow Fornell et al. (2006) and repeat our event study tests grouping firms into “Increase in ACSI” and 
“Decrease in ACSI” portfolios.  As in Fornell et al. (2006), when using these more crude groupings, we find no 
evidence of a significant announcement period reaction. In additional tests, we find no evidence that ACSI levels are 
associated with short-term returns, suggesting that expectations regarding satisfaction levels are already impounded 
by the market. 
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more likely to capture the unexpected component of the information release, but also controls for 
correlated omitted variables that are related to both ACSI levels and stock returns.   
In contrast, marketing studies of the ACSI’s long-run valuation use a variety of unusual 
methods for forming portfolios, with relatively little explanation for these choices.  Fornell et al. 
(2006), for example, form a trading rule that takes long positions in firms with scores above their 
competition and ACSI increases of two points or more, and short positions in firms with scores 
below the competition and declines of two points or more (with few short positions in most 
portfolios).10 Aksoy et al. (2008) form hedge portfolios that go long in firms with ACSI levels 
above the national average-adjusted mean score and increases in satisfaction scores, and short in 
firms with below adjusted-average mean satisfaction levels and declining scores.11  Jacobson and 
Mizik’s (2009) study primarily relies on Aksoy et al.’s (2008) portfolio formation rules, though 
the authors also report that their (mixed) results are robust to other portfolio formation methods.  
The unusual mixture of satisfaction levels and arbitrary cutoffs in satisfaction changes used to 
form portfolios in these studies makes it difficult to conclude that a general trading rule that 
capitalizes on market mispricing of new ACSI information can be established.12 
                                                            
10 Fornell et al. (2006) do not explain why they chose the two point cutoff.  Their use of ACSI levels (relative to 
competitors) in forming portfolios also assumes that market participants do not accurately incorporate this 
information in current stock prices, even though past ACSI levels are highly autocorrelated with current satisfaction 
levels. One explanation for incorporating satisfaction levels in the analysis is the desire to examine whether 
customer satisfaction exhibits increasing or decreasing returns to scale, but this explanation is not used to motivate 
the authors’ empirical tests. Despite the use of ACSI levels and the two point cutoff in forming their study’s long-
run investment  portfolios, neither is used in the same paper’s short-term event study (which only focuses on 
directional changes in ACSI scores).  
11 Aksoy et al. (2008) state that they adjust for national trends in ACSI scores to remove the impact of systematic 
economy-wide sentiment changes.  However, it is not clear why this trend would not be value-relevant to investors 
if such sentiment changes have implications for cash flow or why controlling for the return on the market portfolio 
would not control for economy-wide sentiment changes. In addition, their simple directional change variables 
assume that the magnitude of changes is uninformative.    
12 Sullivan et al. (1999) cautions that return predictability may be an artifact of a large number of researchers' joint 
search for factors that predict returns. That is, researchers collectively consider a large number of trading rules, such 
that by chance a researcher may find what appears to be a highly successful trading rule that outperforms the 
benchmark strategy.  They point out that when researchers evaluate multiple trading rules, testing the performance 
of a single rule in isolation, without taking into account the dependencies across the universe of trading rules being 
evaluated can lead to overstated inferences. 
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When we employ more typical methods for modeling unexpected “innovations” in the 
ACSI using changes in the measure, we find no evidence of long-run mispricing.  At each ACSI 
announcement date, we rank firms into quintiles using the current quarter’s percentage change 
breakpoints.13  We then calculate both equal- and value-weighted portfolio returns to three 
trading strategies. Equal-weighted portfolio returns are computed by initially equal-weighting 
each stock, and value-weighted portfolio returns are computed by initially weighting each firm 
according to its market capitalization as of the close of trading on the trading day immediately 
preceding the ACSI announcement.14    
The Long-Term strategy buys firms and holds the stock for 365 days.  The Mid-Term 
strategy buys firms and holds the stock for 180 days.  The Short-Term strategy buys firms and 
holds the stock until the next wave of ACSI scores is released (typically 3 months).  For each 
strategy, portfolio returns are calculated assuming the investor bought stock at the closing price 
on the ACSI announcement date and held it until the earlier of the indicated period, or until the 
firm’s ACSI score is changed, selling at the closing price on the respective day.15 We tabulate 
portfolio returns for each quintile, as well as for a zero-cost hedge portfolio that purchases stocks 
in the highest quintile and shorts those in the lowest quintile.   
Table 4 presents average daily raw returns, average daily market-adjusted returns, and 
abnormal returns and factor-loadings from the Fama-French three-factor model.  Although raw 
and market-adjusted returns are positive and significant in nearly all of the quintiles across the 
                                                            
13 We compute breakpoints using the current quarter’s ACSI information because the full distribution of changes in 
ACSI is not known to the market at the time of the ACSI announcement. 
14 Since small firms tend to be the most illiquid and thus most likely to be mispriced, power considerations for 
detecting mispricing suggest the use of equal weighed portfolios (see Brav et al., 2000).  However, since small firms 
tend to be illiquid, observed returns will overstate earnable returns (see Blume and Stambaugh, 1983). In which 
case, a value-weighted portfolio will mitigate the concern that the returns to the trading rule are driven by returns to 
small illiquid stocks.  
15 We begin computing returns at the announcement date’s closing price because investors would not know the 
ACSI score at the beginning of the day. Results are similar if we include the ACSI announcement date when 
computing the returns. 
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three strategies, in no case are the returns statistically different between Quintile 1 (largest 
percentage reduction in ACSI) and Quintile 5 (largest percentage increase).  More importantly, 
we find no significant abnormal returns (α) in the risk-adjusted three-factor model over any of 
the three trading horizons.16 Together with the significant short-term market reaction to large 
ACSI changes, the insignificant long-run portfolio test results suggest that the stock market 
quickly and efficiently incorporates the incremental information from ACSI updates in share 
prices.  
Overall, long-run portfolio tests using more typical portfolio formation methods from the 
accounting and finance literatures provide no evidence of mispricing of ACSI information. The 
insignificant portfolio returns are more consistent with Jacobson and Mizik’s (2009) finding that 
mispricing, if present at all, is limited to a small sample of firms, rather than with Fornell et al.’s 
(2006) and Aksoy et al.’s (2008) conclusions that significant long-run abnormal returns can be 
earned due to the market’s short-term mispricing of ACSI measures.17    
 
7. Conclusions 
 Our re-examination of the stock market’s pricing of ACSI information suggests that 
customer satisfaction information, as captured in the ACSI, is value-relevant in that it is 
incrementally predictive of future operating performance, and could therefore be important to 
managers attempting to improve share price. We also find that the market reacts to the 
announcement of large increase in the ACSI quickly after information in the changes are 
released.  However, our examination using well-established methods from the accounting and 
                                                            
16 Our results are robust to restricting the sample to “internet firms” as in Jacobson and Mizik (2009) i.e., SIC codes 
35, 59, and 73. 
17When we repeat our analyses using the small subset of firms from the industries that Jacobson and Mizik (2009) 
include in their internet category, we find no evidence of mispricing for these firms in our sample using our 
methodology.   
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finance literatures provides no evidence that ACSI information can be used to earn abnormal 
long-run returns. 
 While there are a number of reasons why our results may differ from those in earlier 
studies, they do suggest that any conclusions regarding the stock market’s valuation of marketing 
information is quite sensitive to the sample and methodologies employed in the analyses.  
Researchers should be very explicit in articulating the justification for their methodological 
choices, and future studies should examine whether any findings of significant long-run 
abnormal returns hold over long periods of time, rather than reflecting potential short-term 
misunderstanding of new marketing information in evolving settings.  Finally, studies examining 
the valuation of marketing information should examine the broad set of condition necessary 
(from the links between marketing metrics and operating performance through short-term and 
long-term market responses to the release of new information on these metrics) if the stock 
market’s response to marketing initiatives and expenditures is to be fully understood.    
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Appendix 
Cleaning the ACSI data 
Based on the name of each ACSI-entity we find a corresponding GVKEY on 
COMPUSTAT. We classify the ACSI-GVKEY link into one of five mutually exclusive 
categories: 
0 – no record on COMPUSTAT 
1 – clean match 
2 – multiple divisions (ACSI entities) are assigned to a parent’s GVKEY, the 
parent is not covered by ACSI over the period (e.g., Red Lobster and Olive 
Garden are owned by Darden Restaurants) 
3 – a single division is assigned to the parent’s GVKEY, the parent is covered by 
ACSI over the period (e.g. Kraft Foods was a subsidiary of Philip Morris prior to 
2001) 
4 - a single division is assigned to the parent’s GVKEY, the parent is not covered 
by ACSI over the period (e.g., GEICO is a subsidiary of Berkshire Hathaway) 
5 – merger w/overlapping ACSI observations (e.g., ACSI continues to report 
separate scores for Hewlett-Packard and Compaq post-merger) 
6 – merger w/non-overlapping ACSI score data (e.g., ACSI data for US West 
ends 2000, ACSI data for Qwest Communications begins 2001) 
 
In the event of a Category 0 or Category 3 match, the respective record is dropped.  In the event 
of a Category 2 match, we average the ACSI scores across divisions.  In the event of a Category 
5 match, the overlapping records for the surviving entity are retained (e.g., Hewlett-Packard).  
This process results in matching the ACSI data to 243 unique GVKEYs (or company identifiers) 
on COMPUSTAT. 
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Table 1. Operating Performance 
 
This table shows results from regressions of future operating performance on ACSI scores and 
control variables.  Following prior research we calculate cumulative operating performance over 
the four quarters ended subsequent to the announcement date.  We use three measures of 
operating performance (Xt+1), Revenue, Margin, and ROA.  In our regressions we include 
controls for current period operating performance (Xt), firm size (Size), the book-to-market ratio 
(BM), and industry membership. Revenue is revenue (data#2) over the next four quarters as a 
percent of current period total assets (data#44), Margin is net income (data#8) over the next four 
quarters scaled as a percent of revenue over the next four quarters, ROA is net income over the 
next four quarters as a percent of current period total assets, Size is the log of market cap 
(data#14 * data#61) for the quarter-end immediately prior to the ACSI announcement, and BM is 
book value (data #59) scaled by market cap for the quarter-end immediately prior to the ACSI 
announcement. t-statistics appear in parentheses and are based on std. errors clustered by firm 
and by year to correct for serial and cross-sectional dependence respectively. 
 
Xt+1 = α0 ACSIt + α1 SIZEt + α2 BMt + α3 Xt + θ Industry Effects + εt  
 
where X is Sales, Margin, or ROA. ***,**,* indicates statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% level (two-tailed), respectively.  
 
 
 
 Operating Performance Measure (Xt+1) 
Variable Revenue Revenue Margin Margin ROA ROA 
0.27 0.49* 0.44** 0.25* 0.27*** 0.13*** ACSI 
(0.36) (1.71) (2.38) (1.82) (3.65) (3.01) 
 -4.57***  1.57***  0.66*** SIZE  (-4.43)  (4.50)  (5.71) 
 -3.44  -1.29  -0.64 BM  (-1.36)  (-0.77)  (-0.83) 
 0.82***  0.34**  0.55*** Xt  (16.10)  (2.21)  (9.63) 
F 384.65 1927.22 11.82 26.43 58.20 257.57 
R2 45.19 87.22 14.50 34.40 17.90 51.30 
Incremental R2   
from ACSI 0.02 0.07 2.64 1.63 3.95 0.86 
N 1,191 1,191 1,191 1,191 1,191 1,191 
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Table 2. Basic Event Study 
 
This table shows buy-and-hold returns over the 11-day announcement period centered on the 
announcement date.  To test for information leakage, we report buy-and-hold returns over the 
five trading day period prior to the announcement day in Panel A (i.e. t = -5…-1).  To test for 
whether the market prices information in ACSI we report tests of market reaction using returns 
from t = 0 to +5 in Panel B.  We rank all firms into quintiles based on the reported percentage 
change in ACSI.  Market adjusted returns are computed relative to the CRSP value-weighted 
market portfolio. t-statistics based on std. errors clustered by event date to correct for cross-
sectional dependence appear in parentheses. ***,**,* indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% level (two-tailed), respectively. Sample of 1,450 firm-events. 
 
 
 
Panel A. Buy and hold returns by Quintile of Percent Change in ACSI, t = -5…-1 
 
  Quintile 
 Pooled 1 2 3 4 5 
Mean ∆ACSI (%) -0.26 -5.59 -1.93 -0.23 1.64 4.84
Median ∆ACSI (%) 0.00 -4.71 -1.56 0.00 1.37 4.11
N 1450 285 296 296 287 286
  
Raw Returns (%) 0.20 0.37 -0.11 0.15 0.17 0.44*
t-statistic (0.76) (0.81) (-0.26) (0.49) (0.49) (1.75)
        
Market Adjusted (%) -0.07 0.13 -0.41 -0.40 0.09 0.27
t-statistic (-0.26) (0.50) (-1.14) (-1.38) (0.24) (0.56)
 
 
Panel B. Buy and hold returns by Quintile of Percent Change in ACSI, t = 0…+5 
 
  Quintile 
 Pooled 1 2 3 4 5 
Mean ∆ACSI (%) -0.26 -5.59 -1.93 -0.23 1.64 4.84
Median ∆ACSI (%) 0.00 -4.71 -1.56 0.00 1.37 4.11
N 1450 285 296 296 287 286
  
Raw Returns (%) 0.83*** 0.55 0.44 0.81** 0.86** 1.49***
t-statistic (2.74) (1.49) (1.19) (2.00) (2.17) (3.51)
        
Market Adjusted (%) 0.47 0.13 0.20 0.25 0.49 1.30***
t-statistic (1.52) (0.33) (0.73) (0.56) (1.14) (2.68)
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Table 3. Advanced Event Study 
 
This table show results from estimating the three factor model by percent change quintile over 
the 121 trading day period, approximately 6 months, centered on the announcement (t = -
60…60).  We report results including an indicator variable ANNC equal one on the day of the 
announcement and the next 5 trading days (Panel A), 20 trading days (Panel B), 40 trading days 
(Panel C), and 60 trading days (Panel D).  We interact ANNC with each of the included risk-
factors to test for a difference in risk over the respective announcement period.  t-statistics based 
on standard errors clustered by date to correct for cross-sectional dependence appear in 
parentheses. Sample of 1,450 firm-events. 
 
Rt – Rft = α0 + α1 ANNCt + β0 MKTRFt + β1 ANNCt *MKTRFt  
+ s0 SMBt + s1 ANNCt *SMBt + h0  HMLt + h1 ANNCt *HMLt + εt ,   t = -60…60 
 
 
Panel A. 5-Day Announcement Period 
 
 Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 
 coeff. t coeff. t coeff. t coeff. t coeff. t 
α0 -0.01 (-1.44) -0.01 (-0.31) 0.01 (0.37) 0.01 (0.10) 0.01 (0.42)
α1 0.05 (0.84) 0.02 (0.49) 0.03 (0.47) 0.04 (0.60) 0.15 (2.11)
β0 1.00 (13.43) 0.96 (19.72) 0.89 (12.90) 0.93 (13.84) 1.02 (19.16)
β1 -0.11 (-0.95) 0.00 (-0.04) -0.07 (-1.32) -0.02 (-0.30) -0.19 (-2.10)
s0 -0.14 (-2.34) -0.12 (-1.75) -0.14 (-2.34) -0.14 (-2.09) -0.07 (-0.81)
s1 -0.20 (-1.86) -0.06 (-0.60) -0.10 (-0.91) -0.01 (-0.14) -0.11 (-1.08)
h0 0.61 (4.32) 0.49 (6.36) 0.50 (4.04) 0.62 (4.48) 0.69 (5.11)
h1 -0.03 (-0.15) -0.06 (-0.42) 0.11 (0.89) -0.02 (-0.11) -0.15 (-1.08)
F 72.62 80.09 49.87 58.82 112.25 
R2 13.52 16.47 11.07 16.06 11.97 
 
 
Panel B. 20-Day Announcement Period 
 
 Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 
 coeff. t coeff. t coeff. t coeff. t coeff. t 
α0 -0.01 (-1.77) -0.01 (-0.58) 0.01 (0.31) 0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (-0.09)
α1 0.01 (1.06) 0.01 (0.81) 0.01 (0.24) 0.02 (0.36) 0.10 (3.18)
β0 0.99 (12.58) 0.93 (20.34) 0.89 (13.03) 0.91 (13.28) 1.01 (18.21)
β1 0.01 (0.18) 0.15 (1.74) 0.04 (0.58) 0.09 (1.21) 0.01 (0.19)
s0 -0.12 (-2.16) -0.12 (-1.96) -0.14 (-2.31) -0.14 (-1.97) -0.05 (-0.59)
s1 -0.14 (-1.97) -0.01 (-0.14) -0.04 (-0.43) -0.02 (-0.22) -0.14 (-1.25)
h0 0.60 (3.96) 0.46 (5.57) 0.47 (3.95) 0.59 (4.40) 0.68 (5.00)
h1 0.04 (0.27) 0.17 (1.59) 0.24 (2.26) 0.20 (1.90) 0.06 (0.61)
F 69.42 105.56 35.07 53.67 164.68 
R2 13.53 16.52 11.10 16.09 11.99 
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Table 3. Advanced Event Study (Cont’d) 
 
 
 
Panel C. 40-Day Announcement Period 
 
 Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 
 coeff. t coeff. t coeff. t coeff. t coeff. t 
α0 -0.02 (-1.57) 0.01 (0.13) 0.01 (0.59) 0.02 (1.00) 0.01 (0.45)
α1 0.01 (0.34) -0.02 (-0.54) -0.02 (-0.61) -0.04 (-1.36) 0.02 (0.72)
β0 0.98 (13.64) 0.93 (17.43) 0.87 (11.56) 0.87 (13.08) 0.99 (16.39)
β1 0.06 (0.79) 0.10 (1.54) 0.07 (1.09) 0.18 (3.17) 0.07 (1.54)
s0 -0.14 (-3.09) -0.13 (-2.03) -0.16 (-2.84) -0.16 (-2.11) -0.06 (-0.61)
s1 0.01 (0.17) 0.01 (0.10) 0.06 (0.82) 0.08 (0.97) -0.03 (-0.27)
h0 0.55 (3.46) 0.42 (5.12) 0.44 (3.99) 0.50 (4.18) 0.67 (5.40)
h1 0.19 (1.35) 0.20 (2.16) 0.19 (1.43) 0.35 (3.69) 0.06 (0.51)
F 91.09 82.06 36.37 45.58 146.99 
R2 13.54 16.51 11.09 16.21 11.96 
 
 
Panel D. 60-Day Announcement Period 
 
 Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 
 coeff. t coeff. t coeff. t coeff. t coeff. t 
α0 -0.01 (-0.88) -0.01 (-0.21) 0.01 (0.30) 0.01 (0.68) 0.02 (0.83)
α1 -0.01 (-0.74) 0.01 (0.13) 0.01 (0.02) -0.01 (-0.78) -0.01 (-0.06)
β0 0.94 (17.58) 0.91 (15.15) 0.83 (10.13) 0.85 (11.12) 0.97 (14.68)
β1 0.10 (1.11) 0.10 (1.74) 0.12 (2.03) 0.15 (2.47) 0.09 (1.25)
s0 -0.13 (-2.98) -0.14 (-1.98) -0.16 (-2.60) -0.19 (-2.13) -0.13 (-1.26)
s1 -0.03 (-0.34) 0.03 (0.38) 0.03 (0.35) 0.09 (1.03) 0.12 (1.13)
h0 0.57 (3.56) 0.40 (4.22) 0.43 (3.78) 0.52 (3.98) 0.62 (5.64)
h1 0.08 (0.49) 0.17 (1.88) 0.15 (1.25) 0.20 (1.77) 0.13 (0.99)
F 115.90 83.71 47.97 43.01 82.66 
R2 13.54 16.51 11.10 16.15 11.97 
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Table 4. Portfolio Analysis 
 
Estimated returns to trading strategies based on innovations in ACSI.  At each ACSI announcement date firms are ranked into 
quintiles using the current quarter’s breakpoints.  The Long-Term strategy (Panel A) buys firms and holds them for 365 days.  The 
Mid-Term strategy (Panel B) buys firms and holds them for 180 days.  The Short-Term strategy (Panel C) buys firms and holds them 
until the next wave of ACSI scores is released (typically 3 months).  Average daily portfolio returns (%), market adjusted portfolio 
returns (%), and coefficient estimates from the Fama-French three factor model are reported.  t-statistics appear in parentheses. 
Sample of 1,450 firm-events. 
 
 
 
Panel A. Long-Term Strategy Returns 
 
 Equal-weighted Quintile Portfolio Returns  Value-weighted Quintile Portfolio Returns 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Hedge 
Q5-Q1  1 2 3 4 5 
Hedge 
Q5-Q1 
Raw 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 -0.00  0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.02 
t-stat (3.47) (2.95) (2.78) (3.13) (3.34) (-0.14)  (1.95) (1.99) (2.54) (2.39) (2.42) (0.83) 
Mkt Adj. 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.05 -0.00  0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02 
t-statistic (3.79) (3.05) (2.52) (2.95) (3.67) (-0.14)  (1.60) (1.84) (2.40) (2.290 (2.87) (0.83) 
α 0.01 -0.002 -0.01 -0.003 0.002 -0.008  -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 
t-stat (0.95) (-0.15) (-0.90) (-0.30) (0.21) (-0.64)  (-0.40) (-0.52) (0.15) (0.02) (0.70) (0.76) 
β 0.92 0.93 0.91 0.93 0.99 0.07  0.85 0.93 0.88 0.91 0.97 0.12 
t-stat (61.89) (65.72) (58.44) (61.02) (58.86) (3.99)  (45.52) (53.88) (49.89) (48.35) (49.93) (4.08) 
s -0.14 -0.14 -0.16 -0.08 -0.03 0.11  -0.34 -0.36 -0.38 -0.40 -0.26 0.08 
t-stat (-6.30) (-5.98) (-6.68) (-3.62) (-1.12) (4.69)  (-12.54) (-13.19) (-15.09) (-13.96) (-9.42) (2.16) 
h 0.49 0.51 0.60 0.65 0.63 0.14  0.22 0.27 0.35 0.35 0.08 -0.14 
t-stat (17.34) (18.28) (20.59) (21.87) (20.10) (4.35)  (5.77) (7.48) (9.96) (9.45) (2.12) (-2.32) 
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Table 4. Portfolio Analysis (Cont’d) 
 
 
 
Panel B. Mid-Term Strategy Returns 
 
 Equal-weighted Quintile Portfolio Returns  Value-weighted Quintile Portfolio Returns 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Hedge 
Q5-Q1  1 2 3 4 5 
Hedge 
Q5-Q1 
Raw 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.05 -0.01  0.04 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.02 
t-stat (2.88) (2.46) (2.69) (3.25) (2.50) (-0.30)  (1.74) (1.63) (2.90) (1.99) (2.48) (0.82) 
Mkt Adj. 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.03 -0.01  0.03 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.02 
t-stat (2.74) (2.43) (2.43) (3.00) (2.33) (-0.30)  (1.30) (1.25) (2.72) (1.63) (2.40) (0.82) 
α 0.003 -0.003 -0.01 0.01 -0.006 -0.01  -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.02 
t-stat (0.22) (-0.24) (-0.39) (0.49) (-0.45) (-0.57)  (-0.42) (-0.35) (0.91) (-0.40) (0.64) (0.75) 
β 0.96 0.94 0.98 0.95 1.04 0.08  0.91 0.91 0.91 0.96 0.99 0.08 
t-stat (29.20) (44.13) (26.47) (39.83) (28.92) (2.57)  (37.11) (35.69) (38.37) (34.50) (32.15) (1.86) 
s -0.14 -0.17 -0.14 -0.06 -0.07 0.07  -0.32 -0.36 -0.41 -0.31 -0.31 0.01 
t-stat (-4.74) (-4.84) (-3.70) (-1.97) (-1.63) (1.89)  (-8.35) (-8.95) (-10.93) 9-8.33) (-6.59) (18) 
h 0.59 0.49 0.70 0.69 0.68 0.09  0.40 0.20 0.47 0.48 0.35 -0.05 
t-stat (10.27) (11.81) (11.94) (15.26) (11.13) (1.47)  (5.78) (3.57) (9.73) (9.30) (5.03) (-0.47) 
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Table 4. Portfolio Analysis (Continued) 
 
 
 
Panel C. Short-Term Strategy Returns 
 
 Equal-weighted Quintile Portfolio Returns  Value-weighted Quintile Portfolio Returns 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Hedge 
Q5-Q1  1 2 3 4 5 
Hedge 
Q5-Q1 
Raw 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.01  0.06 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.02 
t-stat (2.41) (1.05) (2.13) (2.44) (2.30) (0.13)  (2.13) (1.21) (2.15) (2.04) (2.67) (0.72) 
Mkt Adj. 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.01  0.04 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.02 
t-stat (2.13) (0.50) (1.78) (2.19) (2.09) (0.13)  (1.77) (0.77) (1.86) (1.71) (2.49) (0.72) 
α 0.003 -0.03 -0.01 0.003 0.007 0.004  0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.004 0.02 0.01 
t-stat (0.15) (-1.35) (-0.35) (0.14) (0.30) (0.15)  (0.26) (-0.62) (0.02) (-0.17) (0.78) (0.44) 
β 1.02 0.98 1.01 1.08 1.06 0.04  0.93 0.98 1.02 1.04 1.06 0.13 
t-stat (28.45) (30.72) (29.88) (26.53) (20.77) (0.86)  (26.70) (24.99) (26.35) (25.81) (21.73) (2.43) 
s -0.05 -0.08 -0.14 -0.04 -0.07 -0.01  -0.26 -0.28 -0.29 -0.24 -0.20 0.06 
t-stat (-1.20) (-1.88) (-2.92) (-0.86) (-1.07) (-0.19)  (-5.43) (-5.37) (-5.97) (-5.16) (-3.43) (0.85) 
h 0.65 0.46 0.67 0.74 0.57 -0.07  0.48 0.33 0.61 0.67 0.63 0.15 
t-stat (8.74) (6.98) (11.06) (9.78) (6.18) (-0.80)  (6.23) (3.94) (8.61) (8.96) (7.40) (1.48) 
               
 
 
